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Exotics and Public Policy in the Great Lakes:
The Results of a Workshop at the Biennial Great Lakes Water
Quality Forum
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 23 and 26 September 1999
Eric Reeves
Workshop Coordinator
21 October 1999
§ 2. Exotics, the GLWQA, and ownership of the problem
§ 2.1. Background. The IJC, established under
the Boundary Waters Treaty and given responsibility for
environmental issues under the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement, has been the primary institution for focusing public
and governmental attention on Great Lakes environmental issues.
Other relevant institutions are the Great Lakes Fishery
Commission, established by the Great Lakes Fisheries Convention,
the US Great Lakes Commission Panel on Aquatic Nuisance species,
established by the US Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention
and Control Act, the US Invasive Species Council, established by
a US Executive Order on Invasive Species, and forums which might
be created under the multilateral Biodiversity Treaty. Although
there might be arguments for one of these other organizations to
take a leading role in coordination of binational exotic policy
in the Great Lakes or North America, there was only limited
discussion of that possibility. The central issue raised was
whether or not exotics should be given more of a formal focus
under the GLWQA - most particularly whether or not they should be
subject of a revised annex on the subject.
§ 2.2. The existing terms of the GLWQA. A little
bit of background is necessary to frame the issue. (Please also
see § 9 of the workshop white paper on "Exotic Policy.")
Article II of the GLWQA states that the general purpose of the
agreement is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the waters of the Great Lakes
Basin Ecosystem." (Emphasis added.) Exotics are mentioned in
Annex 6, dealing generally with pollution from shipping sources,
but only with regard to the specific vector of ballast water, and
only in tentative terms. Annex 6 § 1(b) calls upon the US
and Canadian agencies responsible for pollution from shipping (US
Coast Guard, Transport Canada, DFO, Canadian Coast Guard) to
conduct "studies to determine if live fish or invertebrates in
ballast water discharges into the Great Lakes System constitute a
threat to the system." That is all. As I wrote in a report
to the IJC in 1997, when then speaking on behalf of the US Coast
Guard, "By that standard, we have already achieved complete
success. Yes, we have studied ballast water. Yes, it is a threat
to the lakes. (And, by the way, we've also found evidence that
other things in the ballast water, such as pathogenic microbes,
are also a threat.)" That, of course, is not the end of the task
by anyone's standard. In fact, the US and Canadian agencies with
the responsibility for pollution from shipping under Annex 6 have
pressed as hard as they can with a binational research strategy
designed to find practical ways to met the threat. But, as one
Canadian officer still with that responsibility said at the
workshop, the lack of a clear mandate for further action in the
GLWQA undermines that effort. That, at least, is the premise for
the idea of some addition to the agreement.
§ 2.3. Points of agreement and disagreement.
Although the participants in the workshop did include a good
number of people working on other Great Lakes environmental
issues without prior involvement in the specific problem of
exotics, there was no disagreement voiced with the basic
proposition that exotics ought to be considered a "priority,"
among problems such as toxic contaminants and loss of habitats in
the system, and that this was the natural logic of an "ecosystem
approach" to Great Lakes environmental management. Nor was there
any disagreement with the idea that the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement should be read to include concern with exotics as part
of the threat to the "biological integrity" of the lakes. There
was, however, definite and articulate disagreement on the
question of whether or not there should be some formal change to
the agreement - specifically a new annex - to better focus
attention to this problem.
§ 2.4. Reasons for a new GLWQA annex. The majority
of the participants thought that it was time for a new annex on
exotics. (But I must remind the reader that, given the fact that
most of the participants were invited because of their expertise
and prior experience working on exotics, the forum was biased in
this direction.) Some of the specific points voiced were that
exotics are "persistent biological pollution," analogous to
persistent toxic contaminants, that the GLWQA has always been an
evolving document, changing in response to increases in
scientific understanding of threats to the system, and that clear
recognition of exotics as a priority issue in the document would
have concrete value in providing a basis for funding requests by
government agencies attempting to deal with the problem. It was
also pointed out, in comparing the relative priorities of exotics
compared to toxics, that the invasions of exotics (such as the
sea lamprey and the zebra mussel) create the need to add biocides
to the lakes.
§ 2.5. Reasons for not amending the GLWQA. A
carefully framed opposition to the idea of a new annex, or any
other amendment to the agreement, was voiced by a representative
of a major Great Lakes ENGO. He emphasized that in his view
(1) exotics are certainly a priory issue which must
be dealt with, and (2) exotics are already covered by the
general terms of the agreement. Nevertheless, he had strong
reservations about he idea of "opening up the agreement" to any
amendment, even for this important issue, because of the possible
consequences for the integrity of the agreement as a whole, and
the practical dangers of a long, exhaustive debate over the
multitude of new provisions being considered by various parties
in the Great Lakes community. In follow-up comments at the public
session he also pointed out that we have limited time and
resources (a comment which, I would take it, applies to both the
ENGOs and the rather limited staffs of the government agencies
working on exotics in the Great Lakes) and that a proposal for a
new annex might be counterproductive because of the time and
attention taken up with fighting over the terms of amendments
instead of working on the substance of the issue.
§ 2.6. Other approaches to the problem. The GLWQA
and the IJC are not the only way to deal with Great Lakes
environmental issues - and there need not be only one structure
and institution for doing so. A couple of the participants at the
workshop made the point that exotics are now a national and
global problem, and suggested in general terms that we ought to
be looking to new forums for focus on the problem at those
levels. I asked, in response to those comments, if they were
suggesting that it was a problem to be turned over to such bodies
as the US federal ANS Task Force or the new US Invasive Species
Council. One participant, indeed, said that we ought to be
expanding our focus to all ecosystems, terrestrial and avian as
well as aquatic, in order to better share ideas for solving the
problem. However, there seemed to be little feeling that those
forums provided effective means for working on our Great Lakes
issues. It was also pointed out that we need to coordinate
throughout North America with other regional bodies, such
as the other panels being set up in the United States under the
general sponsorship of the federal ANS Task Force and a new
mandate in US NISA 96, and perhaps also the regional councils
being set up to consider coastline and port specific regulations
on ballast water in Canada under the recent amendment to the
Shipping Act.
§ 2.7. A cautionary comment from the marine
industry. In the course of the discussion about a possible
new annex to the GLWQA, a representative of the Great Lakes
transoceanic marine industry pointed out that other provisions in
the agreement on toxics include standards for their control, and
that, without such specific standards for controlling exotics in
ballast water - which should be worked out in cooperation with
industry before being legislated - any amendment to the GLWAQ was
pointless. That was a useful prologue to the next major issue
discussed.
§ 2.8. Ownership and leadership. At a later
point in the session I also asked the participants to comment,
more generally, on who they felt had "ownership" of the problem.
(This was one of the specific questions I was asked to
address by the informal advisory group of representatives from
the organizations sponsoring the workshop.) One of the other
presenters immediately amended that that to speak of "co-owners,"
which I agreed with. None of us have ever had the idea, as I put
it, that there was any value in trying to appoint an "exotics
czar" or any one organization to dictate policy to others. But we
were interested in identifying organizations to which we can
reasonably look to for leadership on the issue. There was no
general consensus on this question. There were the following
comments:
- Perhaps the two general categories of vectors
presented to the workshop, ballast water and shipping, on one
hand, and "commercial uses" such as aquaculture, baitfish, and
aquaria on the other, are naturally different in the applicable
policy structure, with shipping being more of an international
issue and the commercial uses being more of a state and
provincial issue. Therefore, it might be most productive for the
IJC to take the lead in coordinating US and Canadian action on
ballast water and shipping, while the Great Lakes Fishery
Commission provides the same leadership for coordinating state
and provincial action on commercial uses.
- This should be a national issue, and we need to be
coordinating with other regional bodies to make it more so.
- Each of these specific vectors raise different
issues and are covered by different laws, therefore there is
little purpose in trying to combine action on all vectors. There
should be a vector-by-vector approach. (This was, of course,
directly at the other end of the continuum from a prior comment,
that we should try to combine action with those working on
terrestrial and avian organisms.)
- It was argued, again, that the GLWQA provides the
best structure in the region for coordinating action among
agencies.
- This was seconded by a comment from industry that
the IJC is a good institution for coordinating action on ballast
because it has a mandate to create a "level playing field"
between the US and Canada.
- It was also pointed out that action can proceed on
"multiple tracks" among many agencies, with the IJC playing a
general coordinating role.
- It was suggested that the IJC should also be
coordinating with the US and Canadian Council for Environmental
Coordination (CEC) established under the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
- One of the academic experts asked "Who has a short
list?" of priorities for action among the various agencies
involved. (I do not believe there was any answer to this
question.)
- One of the government managers commented that
"impotence is born of complexities," which I took to mean that
part of the problem may be the number of legal structures and
institutions involved in the process.
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